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A Tale of Two Marks, And
Other Antitrust Concerns
By Pamela Jones Harbour*

I. Introduction
Having practiced antitrust law for almost twenty years, I
believe I am qualified to make the following observation: this is an
interesting time in antitrust. The law is evolving in ways I could not
have envisioned when I first entered the field.
For example, five Justices of the Supreme Court recently
decided in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.I to
abandon the vertical restraints dichotomy the Court created thirty
years ago in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.2 In Sylvania,
the Court adopted an extremely familiar, and very important,
distinction between price and non-price vertical restraints. 3 For as

* Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. This article is adapted from
Commissioner Harbour's remarks at the 7th Annual Antitrust Colloquium at the
Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola University Chicago School of
Law on April 13, 2007. I would like to thank Prof. Spencer Weber Waller for
inviting me to participate in the Colloquium.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
2

Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

3 A vertical restraint of trade refers to an agreement or arrangement between

actors at different levels of the distribution system. An agreement between a
manufacturer and a retailer would, for instance, be a vertical agreement. A vertical
pricing agreement typically would involve an agreement between a manufacturer
and a retailer regarding the price at which the retailer would resell the goods of the
manufacturer to consumers. If such a vertical price fixing agreement required the
retailer to sell goods only at or above a price specified by the manufacturer, it
would be a vertical minimum price fixing agreement. Thomas K. McCaw,
Competition and "Fair Trade": History and Theory, 16 REs. IN ECON. THEORY
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long as I have been practicing law- at least, until now-vertical
price restraints have been per se unlawful, while non-price vertical
restraints were judged under the rule of reason.4 But in the wake of
Justice Kennedy's Leegin opinion, the distinction between price and
non-price vertical restraints no longer matters. Now, all vertical
restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason.
Members of the US antitrust legal community packed the
Supreme Court gallery during oral argument in the Leegin case.
Many were intensely interested in whether the Court would uphold
per se illegality of vertical minimum price fixing. The Justices and
the parties vigorously debated the merits and demerits of the policy.
The very existence of that debate gave me some slight hope that
vertical minimum price fixing would remain presumptively illegal.
But even then I doubted that the Court would reach a consumerfriendly result.
The Leegin outcome is distressing, to put it mildly. I have
spent most of my career, in both state and federal government, as an
advocate for consumers above all else. Unlike the Leegin majority, I
maintain that the price/non-price distinction still matters a great
185, 185 (1996). So-called non-price vertical restraints generally involve the area
within which or customers to whom a retailer may sell a manufacturer's goods.
Each type of vertical restraint may increase prices to consumers; however,
minimum pricing restraints raise prices directly and non-price restraints may do so,
if at all, only indirectly. The Supreme Court in Sylvania found that this differential
impact, among other things, warranted different legal treatment for price- and nonprice vertical restraints. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n. 18.
4 "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
N. Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Such agreements and practices are
said to be per se unlawful. Antitrust liability under the rule of reason requires a far
more extensive inquiry. "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences." Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The
rule of reason, thus, asks whether the restraint on balance actually harms
competition more than it promotes it.
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deal-to Congress, to business investors, to many law enforcement
officials, and to eery bargain-conscious consumer in America. The
Court dismantled important consumer protections in Leegin. I find
myself unable to gracefully accept that and move on. The issues
simply are too important to this country.
It is probably obvious by now that I am expressing my own
personal views, and not those of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) or any other Commissioner. This article will begin by looking
at insights from "Two Marks" to highlight the difference between
things we believe to be true as opposed to those we can prove to be
so. The article will then explore the works of economist Robert
Steiner to show how the insights of these Two Marks, if ignored, can
distort economic models, as well as any rules of law that may rely on
those models. The article will next describe the basis for my
skepticism regarding the wisdom of the Court's resolution of Leegin.
At the end of the article I will offer a remedial prescription for the
harm the Court has inflicted on American consumers with its Leegin
decision

II. The Two Marks
So, who are the two Marks?
A. Mark Twain
The first Mark is Mark Twain. We all know about him.
Growing up, we were introduced to Tom, Huck, jumping frogs, and
an extensive inventory of Twain's colorful sayings. I am indebted to
my friend and former colleague, Michael Salinger (until recently the
Director of the FTC's Bureau of Economics), for sharing the Mark
Twain quote 5 I want to highlight. Twain's statement: "It ain't what
you don't know that jets you into trouble. It's what you know for
sure that just ain't so."
Keep that quote in mind as I relate the following fact: it has
been twenty-three years since the Court affirmed a judgment on the
5Michael A. Salinger, Assessing Whether What We Know is So, Address at
the American Bar Association 54th Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, at 1 (Mar. 31,
2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/salinger/060331ABABreakfast
withtheBureauDirectors.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
6 Brainyquote.com, Mark Twain Quotes, available at http://www.brainy
quote.com/quotes/authors/m/marktwain.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
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merits for a private antitrust plaintiff in a vertical price fixing case.
That case was Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co..7 Even here,
the Court's language leads most commentators to treat the case as if
the defendant had won. 8 The Court engaged in "unidimensional
economic analysis," which inflated the likely procompetitive benefits
of vertical price fixing with the assumption "that competition at the
retail level is either unimportant or will flow naturally from
interbrand competition at the producer level." 9
Many antitrust scholars and practitioners have criticized the
Warren Court for creating unacceptable levels of unpredictability in
antitrust enforcement.' 0 This criticism, indeed, helped spawn the past
generation of pro-defendant antitrust holdings. I agree that the proper
antidote was to incorporate rigorous economic thinking into antitrust
analysis. I worry, however, that the pendulum has swung too far the
other way based on mistaken assumptions regarding likely market
outcomes. 1
The basic inquiry of economics is to establish what is true on
average. But identifying the average result may not always be good
enough to ensure consumer-friendly outcomes--or, at least,
outcomes that consumers on average would favor. We need to
address a fundamental question: when economists create their
predictive models, do their assumptions adequately reflect
marketplace realities? And if they do not, do courts that rely on those
predictive models do more harm than good to the economy? With

7 Monsanto

Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). Overall, it
has been 22 years since the Court affirmed any antitrust judgment on the merits for
a private plaintiff. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 611 (1985).
8 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 7.1a at 372 (2d ed. 2006) ("The
decisions of the 1980s also made the conspiracy requirements for applying Section
1 of the Sherman Act to vertical restraints more rigorous than it had previously
been. Decisions such as Monsanto . . .appear to use that requirement as a
surrogate for substantive policy limits on the law's reach and as a vehicle for
enhancing defendants' prospects for obtaining summary judgment on such
claims.").
9Id. § 7.4 at 394.
'oSee, e.g., ERNEST GELLHORN
NUTSHELL 240-41 (5th ed. 2004).

" See infra note 21.

ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN

A
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respect to economic models of vertical restraints, the
polite answer to
2
both of those questions is: we really do not know.'
Almost every major antitrust case these days seems to involve
dueling economists. Each side of the case often presents one or more
eminently qualified expert economists who presumably analyzes the
same basic set of facts and data. Yet the experts often reach very
different outcomes. They frequently offer conflicting opinions
regarding the competitive effects of the evaluated conduct. It is
unclear whether we should be more perplexed if half of those
economists are wrong, or if all of them are right.
Hence, my Mark Twain quote, which captures the essence of
the expert economist conundrum. Do these experts really "know"
what they say they know? And if not, how much does this
uncertainty cost U.S. consumers? Moreover, if most economists
believe something to be true when "it just ain't so," a court relying on
those beliefs might well adopt a rule of law that is incapable of
achieving the intended results. It might even do more harm than
good. That is precisely what the Court did in Leegin.
B. Mark Blaug
Now, turn to the second Mark: Mark Blaug. He is a highly
esteemed emeritus professor of economics at the University of
London. Economist friends tell me that Prof. Blaug is as much a
philosopher as he is an economist, and that he has written extensively
on the history of economic thought and analysis.
Challenge: The Magazine of Economic Affairs published an
interview with Prof. Blaug in its May-June 1998 issue. 13 The
interview of Prof. Blaug began with a discussion of "falsifiability."
He said, "In confronting a theory, it should be possible to think of
evidence that, if found,
4 would falsify the theory or would lead you to
abandon the theory."1

THE

12

See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2737 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

13

The Problems with Formalism: Interview with Mark Blaug, CHALLENGE:
MAG.

OF

ECON.

AFF.

(May-June

1998),

available

at

http://www.btintemet.com/-paenews/Blaugl.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007)
[hereinafter Interview with Mark Blaug]. The publication's current editorial board
includes four Nobel laureates in economics: Paul A. Samuelson (1970), Kenneth J.
Arrow (1972), Robert M. Solow (1987), and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2001).
14 Id.
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He went on to observe that if a theory, no matter how strongly
believed, cannot be falsified, "then whatever this belief is, it is not
science because scientific beliefs, theories, hypotheses, or whatever
'5
you want to call them, should be falsifiable at least in principle."'
He noted that mainstream economists preach falsifiability, but
they do not practice it.
In other words, when confronted with contrary evidence of
some beloved theory, they adjust the theory, or they
minimize the evidence. Sometimes they even ignore the
evidence. They do not look very hard at contrary evidence,
preferring16 to confirm rather than to look for refuting
evidence.
Prof. Blaug advocated a change in the priorities of
economists. He criticized the profession for assigning "enormous
prestige to any kind of economic theory that is mathematically
expressed, but almost none to historical argument or a case study.
This is a clever way of marshaling empirical evidence
to prove a
' 7
particular economic theory. That is what is wrong."'
His proposed remedy for the economics profession included
"more empiricism, more history, more getting your nose dirty in the
8
data, surveying people, asking opinion, [and] monitoring behavior."'
I am by no means an economist. But here we have a highly
regarded member of the profession-someone well within the
ranks--criticizing a key aspect of how economists do their jobs. At

15id.
16 Id.

Prof. Blaug is not alone in this criticism of the profession. "The material

about business behavior that students read about in economics textbooks, and
almost all of the new theoretical material developed by mainstream professionals
and published in the profession's leading journals was composed by economists

who sat down in some comfortable chair and ...simply made it up." Barbara R.
Bergman, Needed: A New Empiricism, 4 ECONOMISTS' VOICE, Iss. 2, Art. 2, (Mar.
2007), at 1, available at www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss2
download document) (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
17 Interview with Mark Blaug, supra note 13, at 4.

(follow

hyperlink;

'8Id. at 5. "But is there any other discipline which leaves it's [sic] theory
littered with masses of elegant hypotheses which are testable against observation,
without so testing them? Do we have any testable hypothesis about why
economists collectively behave with this lack of regard for scientific method?"
David Heigham, Letter: Why Are Economists So Unscientific?, 4 ECONOMISTS'
VOICE, Iss. 2, Art. 5, (May 2007), at 2, available at www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss2
(follow hyperlink; download document) (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).

38
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the same time, I am urged as an FTC commissioner to place
increasing faith in economic theories and analyses. I often am asked
to rely on the predictions of economists to resolve outcomedeterminative aspects of the FTC's enforcement decisions.
Beliefs are a critical part of what makes us human.
Sometimes, beliefs can enhance intelligence. But at other times,
beliefs may actually restrict the application of intelligence. We have
to be able to distinguish between things we can factually
demonstrate, and things we "know" are true only because we believe
them or believe in them.
The second Mark understands the difference between the two
concepts. Others, I fear, may not. This reality exacerbates my
concerns about the current state of antitrust law in general, and my
particular concern that the Court majority in Leegin neither asked the
right questions nor found the right answers.

III. Robert L. Steiner
Robert Steiner 19 shares my concern that most economic
models do not accurately reflect how markets for consumer goods
actually operate. Steiner has proposed economic models which
19 I greatly enjoyed hearing Mr. Steiner's recent presentation on "The Virtual
Equivalence of Horizontal and Vertical Competition." Robert L. Steiner, The
Virtual Equivalence of Horizontal and Vertical Competition - An Analysis of the
Sources of Market Power in Consumer Goods Industries, Speech at the 7th Annual
Loyola Antitrust Colloquium (April 13, 2007).
In 2004, 1 participated in an
American Antitrust Institute program dedicated to Mr. Steiner's work. This
"Steinerfest"-and my preparations for it-reinforced my view that we still know
far too little about the real-world effects of vertical restraints. Pamela Jones
Harbour, An Enforcement Perspective on the Works of Robert L. Steiner: Why
Retailing and Vertical RelationshipsMatter,49 ANTITRUST BULL. 985, 986 (2004),
available at http://www.ftc.govlspeeches/harbour/O50311antitrustbulletin.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 6, 2007).
"[T]he challenging questions posed by Steiner are in need of answers.
Antitrust economists should rise to the challenge and seek these answers, lest the
profession risk pursuing an antitrust enforcement policy that, by default, leaves no
role for procompetitive vertical enforcement." Other papers presented at this
program were published in the same volume.
That day-long program also strengthened my understanding of current federal
enforcement policy regarding vertical restraints. The vertical agenda, or lack
thereof, appears to reflect a policy choice based on fear-the fear that something
bad might happen if vertical restraints are attacked. It does not appear to be based
on an informed belief that something good will happen if vertical restraints are not
challenged.
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attempt to provide more accurate predictions of whether particular
vertical restrants are likely to benefit or harm consumers. The Leegin
majority would have profited from a better understanding of Steiner's
works.
A. Distribution Competition
Steiner identifies a form of "competition" between
manufacturers and retailers,
which economists largely have
ignored. 1 Steiner argues that neglecting this area of distribution
competition can result in mistaken-and potentially harmfulapplication of the antitrust laws, particularly in retail-driven
consumer goods markets.22
Most economic models contain a simplifying assumption: that
distribution and retail channels are perfectly competitive. Based on
this assumption, distribution is viewed as an undifferentiated passthrough for manufacturing costs, competitive conditions, and the like.
Steiner calls this the "single-stage" model.23 Unfortunately, this
model is based largely on untested theories of how distribution
works.
In reality, distribution intermediaries and retailers often face
imperfect competition. 24 Some distribution players may be able to
exercise a degree of market power. 25 This should make sense to
anyone who regularly shops in the real world. Surely, one would not

20

See infra notes 22-23.

21

See Michael P. Lynch, Why Economists Are Wrong to Neglect Retailing and

How Steiner's Theory Provides an Explanation of Important Regularities, 49
ANTITRUST BULL. 911, 912 (2004) ("Though Steiner's theory [of vertical

competition] provides an explanation for otherwise puzzling empirical regularities,
his theory seems to have had little or no effect on the way mergers and vertical
restrictions are analyzed by antitrust economists.").
22 See, e.g., Robert L. Steiner, The Third Relevant Market, 45 ANTITRUST
BULL. 719 (2000); Robert L. Steiner, Intrabrand Competition - Stepchild of
Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 155 (1991); Robert L. Steiner, Nature of Vertical
Restraints,30 ANTITRUST BULL. 143 (1985).
23 Robert L. Steiner, A Dual-Stage View of the Consumer Goods Economy, 35
J. ECON. ISSUES 27, 27 (2001).
24 Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Casefor a Per Se
Rule Against Vertical PriceFixing, 71 GEO. L. J. 1487, 1492 n.22 (1983).
25 Id. (citing Lawrence A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, 379
(1977)).
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assume that big-box stores-like Wal-Mart or Target-are perfectly
competitive with a mom-and-pop store. Thus, the simplifying
assumption in most economic models of distribution-that
distribution and retailing are perfectly competitive-is objectively
flawed.
Steiner would substitute a "dual-stage" model for the
prevailing single-stage model. His model would account for the
competitive relationships between manufacturers, distributors, and
Steiner's concept of
retailers in consumer goods markets.26
intrabrand "vertical competition" between manufacturers and retailers
is fundamentally at odds with the "Chicago School" approach,27
which views successive levels of distribution as being fully
complementary rather than competitive.28 Steiner finds empirical
support for his vertical competition claims, and he notes that these
if manufacturers and retailers were,
empirical results would not occur
29
in fact, fully complementary.
B. Rallying Cry for Economists
As an antitrust practitioner, my primary focus has always
been on marketplace realities. For this reason, Steiner's insights
resonate with my intuitions about consumer goods markets, as well as
with my past experience as a state enforcement official.
26

Steiner, supra note 23, at 29-31.

Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 8, §1.4 at 9. Many Supreme Court decisions
reflect Chicago School analysis without fully embracing it. "Chicago School
commentators rely heavily on deductive analysis from standard economic
See, e.g., Leegin,
assumptions and generally favor a smaller role for antitrust."
127 S. Ct. at 2705; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 36. See also Mark Blaug, Is Competition
Such a Good Thing? Static Efficiency versus Dynamic Efficiency, 19 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 37, 47 (2001) ("The Chicago school does not deny that there is a case for
antitrust law but they doubt that it is a strong case because most markets, even in
the presence of high concentration ratios, are 'contestable' (Bork, 1978). How do
we know? We know because [of] the good-approximation assumption: the
economy is never far away from its perfectly competitive equilibrium growth path!
Believe it or not, that is all there is to the 'antitrust revolution' of the Chicago
School."). The "good-approximation assumption" refers to the intuition that
observed prices and quantities may be treated as good proxies for long-term
equilibrium values. Id. at 40.
28 See, e.g.,William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75
27

CALIF. L. REV. 933, 937-38 (1987).
The Inverse Association Between the Margins of
29 Robert L. Steiner,
Manufacturersand Retailers, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG. 717 (1993).
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Steiner highlights the failure of current economic models to
address distribution channel interaction in vertical restraints
analysis. 30 It is both curious and troubling that there is no substantial
body of economic literature and scholarship on distribution issues.
This inattention is especially difficult to explain at this juncture in the
history of antitrust law-a time when principles of economics
so
31
strongly influence enforcement decisions and judicial outcomes.
We need economic modelers willing to tackle the
complexities of real-world markets.
We need something more
concrete than untested or untestable assumptions and oversimplifying omissions.
Again, I am not an economist. I will not take a position on
where I think the economic debate on these issues will, or should,
ultimately come out. But Steiner and others-including myselfworry about possible errors of under-enforcement against vertical
restraints.3 2 If enforcement decisions are made based on fear of the
unknown, the enforcers are very likely to make some costly, wrong
decisions. Steiner has identified the potential for harm to consumers,
and he has posed tough questions that deserve answers. If, as Steiner
claims, economic models of distribution markets are incomplete and
inaccurate, they can hardly provide courts and enforcers with an
accurate assessment of whether vertical distribution restraints benefit
or harm consumers.
At the end of my term as FTC Commissioner, I want to be
able to say at least two things: that the Commission lived up to the
Hippocratic admonition, "first, do no harm," and that the
Commission had an effective vertical restraints enforcement agenda.

30

Robert L. Steiner, Intrabrand Competition - Stepchild of Antitrust, 36

ANTITRUST BULL.

155,195-96 (1991) ("Intrabrand competition owes its stepchild

status in substantial part to flawed economic models.... Manufacturers appear [in
these flawed models] to deal directly with consumers or to sell to them through an
inert distribution segment that simply adds the bare-bones cost of distribution,

including a perfectly competitive rate of return, to factory prices.").
31 "Economic discussion, such as the studies the Court relies upon, can help
provide answers to these questions, and in doing so, economics can, and should,
inform antitrust law. But antitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate
economists' (sometimes conflicting) views." Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2729 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
32 See, e.g., William Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing, Vertical Market
Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REv. 983 (1985); Warren
S. Grimes, BrandMarketing, IntrabrandCompetition, and the MultibrandRetailer:
The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 83 (1995).
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I cannot condone a "default" enforcement policy based on deliberate
I hope
ignorance that would endanger both of these goals.
economists, therefore, will rise to this new challenge, and provide
well-targeted scholarship and better tools for analysis.

IV. Leegin: The Future Without Per Se Illegality for

Vertical Minimum Price Fixing
The Leegin case presented the issue of per se illegality for
resale price maintenance-or, as I prefer to call it, vertical minimum
price fixing. In particular, the case highlights the dueling views of
state and federal antitrust enforcers.
State enforcers argued in Leegin for continued per se
illegality-a view that, in myi judgment, accords with experience and
pro-consumer public policy.

3

The Solicitor General, the Department

of Justice Antitrust Division, and three of the four other
Commissioners of the FTC maintained that a full rule of reason
analysis should apply, and that the Court's 1911 decision in Dr.
35 Miles
Med. Co. v. John D. Park& Sons Co 34 should be overruled.

I disagreed with the position taken by the FTC in the Leegin
case. I disagreed so strongly, in fact, that I issued a twenty-page
public statement setting forth my views on minimum vertical price
fixing and the merits of the Leegin case. 36 The statement asked,
albeit unsuccessfully, for the Court to reaffirm Dr. Miles. I will
briefly summarize the main points of the statement.
A. Historical Context
To provide some factual background, Leegin is a
manufacturer of women's fashion accessories marketed under the
Brighton ® name. Leegin entered into vertical minimum price fixing
agreements with downstream retailers, primarily specialty
33 Brief for the States As Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Leegin, 127 S.

Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 621651.
34 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
35 Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Leegin,
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 04-480), 2007 WL 173650.
36 Open Letter from Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The
Illegality of Vertical Minimum Price Fixing, to the Supreme Court of the United
States (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/070226
verticalminimumpricefixing.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
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boutiques. 37 Under Dr. Miles, these types of agreements were
condemned as per se illegal price fixing since 1911.-3 8 Leegin asked
the Court to reverse Dr. Miles39 and, in effect, legitimize vertical
minimum price fixing, even though consumers inevitably would face
higher prices as a result.
Looking at the underlying history helps reveal the
significance of Leegin. When the Great Depression began, Dr. Miles
was the law of the land. During the Depression, however, Congress
authorized the states to conduct "natural experiments" in vertical
minimum price fixing. Congress did so by enacting an antitrust
exemption for so-called "fair trade" laws. Adopted by the states,
these laws permitted vertical minimum price fixing. 40 Virtually every
state eventually adopted some form of fair trade law.
By the mid-1970s, however, consumers had grown
dissatisfied with the effects of vertical minimum price fixing. Most
states repealed their fair trade laws. In 1975-faced with a stagnant
economy and rampant inflation-Congress reviewed the decadeslong natural experiment and deemed it a failure. For the express
purpose of providing lower prices to consumers, Congress adopted
the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,41 which repealed the
earlier antitrust exemption for vertical minimum price fixing.
Congress found that vertical minimum price fixing had
increased prices to consumers by as much as thirty-seven percent,
reduced innovation and efficiency in distribution and retailing,
increased the rate of business failures as much as fifty-five percent,
reduced entry opportunities for new competitors and products,
systematically lowered sales levels per outlet, and diminished the
level of both intra- and inter-brandcompetition.42
Congress considered-and rejected-several justifications for
vertical minimum price fixing. These justifications should sound
familiar, because they are the same ones often heard today: the
promotion of small businesses; the provision of added services; and
37 See

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 app. D (2007)

(No. 06-480), (expert report of Professor Kenneth Elzinga).
38 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 400-01.
39 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.
40 Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 75-314, 50 Stat. 693 (1937);
McGuireBill, Pub. L. No. 82-542, 66 Stat. 631 (1852).
41 Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
42 See H. R. REP. No. 94-341(1975); S. REP. No. 94-466, at 2-3 (1975).
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the prevention of free-riding.43 I find this history compelling. I see
no reason to undo what Congress so deliberately set forth 44back in
1975, especially in the absence of new economic information.
B. Modern Realities
At least a few modem economists and antitrust scholars agree.
Prof. Warren Grimes at Southwestern Law School, among others, has
pointed to problems resulting from allowing manufacturers to
compete for retailer loyalty by artificially enhancing margins via
higher consumer prices. This practice, according to Prof. Grimes, is
akin to providing retailers with a consumer-funded bribe. Prof.
Grimes argues that this form of commercial bribery is
indistinguishable from any other in terms of the potential harm to
competition.45
In addition, Prof. Grimes notes that if retail margins are
enhanced at consumers' expense, a multi-product retailer will have a
perverse, and undisclosed, incentive to steer consumers toward
particular products. The retailer will do so, even if those products are
not the best "match" in terms of price, features, and value.46 How
this incentive to push certain products benefits consumers is beyond
me. Nor do I understand how higher prices or margins, by
themselves, will incentivize retailers to provide any enhanced
services to consumers, and certainly not in some precise mix desired
by a manufacturer.
I found unpersuasive the Leegin majority's reliance on the
concept of "free-riding" as a justification for abandoning the rule of
per se illegality. 47 I am skeptical that the avoidance of free-riding
justifies vertical minimum price fixing, except under rare and narrow
circumstances. Professor William S. Comanor and Frederic M.
Scherer shared this view with the Court; their amicus brief in Leegin
stated "there is skepticism in the economic literature about how often

S. REP. No. 94-466, at 2-3 (1975).
44 See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2732 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating "[w]hat is
remarkable about the majority's arguments is that nothing in this respect is new.")
(emphasis in original).
45 Grimes, supra note 32, at 109-10.
46 Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical
43

Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REv. 815, 834-35 (1992).
47 See Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2717.
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[free-riding] occurs. ' ' 48 The dissenting Justices in Leegin also
expressed doubts about the free-riding justification for antitrust
leniency for vertical minimum price fixing.
During the Leegin oral argument, I was pleased to see Justice
Breyer confront Leegin's counsel with the fact that none of Leegin's
economic arguments in favor of vertical minimum price fixing
reflected new scholarship. Indeed, Justice Breyer stated, virtually the
same arguments had been set forth in a 1966 treatise on resale price
maintenance.5 °
Justice Breyer also questioned whether the Court, or
Congress, was better situated to balance the competing benefits and
harms to consumers and producers. 5 1 His questions during oral
argument suggested that Congress might be better suited to explore
an important question: whether the 1975 repeal of the fair trade laws
spurred retail discounting that could be lost if Dr. Miles were
overruled.5 2 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsberg, repeated and amplified these concerns in a particularly
cogent dissent.
Until someone demonstrates otherwise, the principle should
stand: vertical minimum price fixing almost always leads to higher
prices for consumers. Presumptive illegality, therefore, represents
sound antitrust, economic, and public policy. The Court should have
been very reluctant to change a longstanding rule of law in response
to theoretical economic assumptions, especially when these
It is
assumptions lack rigorous and valid empirical support.
unrealistic to assume that distribution and retailing are perfectly
competitive in the real world. And once such assumptions are
abandoned, most existing economic models are likely to fall apart.

48

Brief for Comanor and Scherer as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at

6, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173679.
4' Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2729-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5o

Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No.

06-480), 2007 WL 967030.
"' Id. at 17-19. "But both Congress and the FTC, unlike courts, are wellequipped to gather empirical evidence outside the context of a single case. As
neither has done so, we cannot conclude with confidence that the gains from
eliminating the per se rule will outweigh the costs." Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2737
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Those costs may include putting at risk substantial
investments in discount retailing. Id. at 2735-36.
52 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730-3 1.
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These models likely will not be capable of proving that vertical
minimum price fixing is, on balance, good for consumers.
I am willing to concede that it makes sense to have a modified
per se rule, and to 'allow a respondent to rebut the presumption of
illegality. But the respondent should bear the burden of proof, and
should be required to introduce sufficient factual evidence to
demonstrate why a particular restraint is necessary in a specific
market. For example, a restraint might be needed to cure an
identifiable market failure that could not be cured by less restrictive
means-provided, of course, that the net benefit to consumers would
outweigh the presumptive harm.
Prof. Blaug's advice to consider lessons from history would
Our country has already
been
beneficial to the Court.
have
experimented with vertical minimum price fixing. Congress declared
the experiment a failure. If this country is going to experiment once
again with vertical minimum price fixing, then only Congress, not the
Court, should sanction a repeat of that experiment. Let Leegin-and
other manufacturers who would like to engage in resale price
maintenance-explain to Congress why the 1975 repeal of the fair
trade laws was a mistake.
In July 2007, I appeared before the Antitrust Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee to talk about Leegin.53 Sen. Herbert
Kohl chaired the hearing and seemed sympathetic to my views on
vertical minimum price fixing. 54 If my perception were correct, then
manufacturers may have a difficult time convincing Congress that
minimum vertical price fixing is good for consumers. During my

53 Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Leegin Decision:
The End of Consumer Discounts or Good Antitrust Policy?, Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, I 10th Cong. (July 31, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/07073 ltest.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
54 Senator Herbert Kohl, Subcomm. Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., The
Leegin Decision: The End of Consumer Discounts or Good Antitrust Policy?,
Statement Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 110 th Cong. (July 3 1,
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-statement.cfm?
at
available
2007),
id=2893&witid=470 (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). "So I know first hand the dangers
to competition and discounting of permitting the practice of vertical price fixing....
We will need to carefully examine whether the Supreme Court's abrupt change to
the settled antitrust rule forbidding vertical price fixing will threaten today's vibrant
competitive retail marketplace and the pocketbooks of consumers, and consider
whether legislation will be necessary to protect the continued existence of
consumer discounts."
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testimony, I offered the following insights on the post-Leegin world
of retailing:
As a general matter of antitrust law, a person who can
"profitably ...

maintain prices above a competitive level

for a significant period of time" is said to possess
But the Leegin majority
actionable market power.
articulates a more lenient rule-of-reason standard for
minimum vertical price fixing. To quote Justice Kennedy's
version of the rule, "pricing effects" are not enough to
establish market power; the plaintiff must make "a further
showing of anticompetitive conduct."To my mind, that is a
virtual euphemism for per se legality, because it will be so
difficult for any plaintiff to make out a case. Therefore,
absent Congressional action, I envision a post-Leegin world
where there is no effective check on vertical minimum
price fixing.What will this look like to consumers? Well, if
you were to walk through a mass merchandiser's store, you
would see thousands of items produced by hundreds of
manufacturers. Each of these manufacturers could require
retailers to enter express agreements along the lines of,
"you must sell my products at these prices." Manufacturers
also would be able to dictate a variety of other aspects of
retail sale, such as shelf location, display spacing, and
presentation.
" Will the store owner be permitted to make any
"
"

meaningful decisions?
Who will really be running the store?
How will retailers compete to offer consumers the best
deal?

Intrabrand and interbrand competition may continue to
exist, but only to the extent it benefits manufacturers, not
consumers. In short, the American marketplace will no
be driven by consumer preferences. And this is
longer 55
wrong.

55 Harbour, supra note 53 (quoting Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n,
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §0.1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bc/docs/horizmer.shtm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
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The post-Leegin world will turn retail merchants into mere
sales agents for manufacturers. Retailers, however, should be the
purchasing agents for consumers, not just the sales agents for
manufacturers.
I want to see retailers compete by trying to
anticipate consumers' preferences, at prices consumers will find
attractive. Some retailers may innovate and provide efficiencies that
can be passed on to consumers as lower prices. Other retailers may
charge higher prices and offer superior service and ambiance.
Consumers should be allowed to make choices among these different
options, voting with their wallets for the mix of goods, services, and
prices they prefer.57

V. Conclusion
Prof. Blaug criticizes economists for essentially ignoring realworld facts. From an antitrust enforcement perspective, this criticism
dovetails neatly with Mark Twain's warning that trouble comes from
"what you know for sure that just ain't so."
In a 1977 law review article, Prof. Emeritus John Flynn of the
University of Utah College of Law noted that some people question
whether economics can be a truly objective science, capable of
verifying real-world events.
He cautioned that so-called
"quantitative" testing is not always as accurate as it might seem.
The first step is to measure whatever can be easily
measured. This is OK as far as it goes. The second step is
to disregard that which can't be measured or give it an
arbitrary quantitative value. This is artificial or misleading.
The third step is to presume that what can't be measured
easily really isn't very important. This is blindness. The

56

See Ruth Prince Mack, Controlling Retailers 91 (Faculty of Political Sci. of

Columbia Univ. ed., Columbia Univ. Press & P. S. King & Son) (1936) "Control of
prices in part determined whether the retailer was the 'selling agent for
manufacturer' or 'the purchasing agent for the consumer."'
57 See H. R. Rep., supra note 42, at 5 (quoting FTC Chairman Lewis Engman)
("Simply put the argument assumes an identity between cost and value and thereby
begs the question of the competitive marketplace by denying the consumer the right
to assign his own value to the intangible asset of trademark or image."); Pitofsky,
supra note 24, at 1493 ("[A]uthorizing the manufacturer to decide what mix of
products and services is desirable, instead of allowing the market to decide that
question, is inconsistent with the nation's commitment to a competitive process").
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fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured
really doesn't exist. This is suicide.58
I am not ready to let Dr. Miles rest in peace without a fight.
Based on what little has been "measured" thus far, and my own
common-sense observations, I truly believe that consumers will be
better off if vertical minimum price fixing remains presumptively
illegal. Both the majority and the dissent in Leegin recognized that
there is virtually no empirical support for the theoretical economic
models relied upon by the Leegin majority. 59 I will accept that I am
wrong-if and when economists do the right kind of work to prove
vertical minimum price fixing is beneficial. Until then, however, I
will resist shifting the risk of harm to the American consumers I am
sworn to protect.
Fixing a minimum resale price necessarily raises the prices of
goods purchased by consumers. Some economists have propounded
theories that, under narrow circumstances, consumers might benefit
from those higher prices.
According to the Leegin majority,
consumers should pay those higher prices-without any possibility of
a damage recovery-unless or until the consumer can prove the
absence of benefit from those higher prices. In other words, all
doubts are resolved in favor of the manufacturer who raised the
prices.
Consumers, not manufacturers, deserve the benefit of the
doubt. In Leegin, the Court has proven itself unwilling to protect
consumers from higher prices. It is now Congress' turn to remind the
Court of the first rule of antitrust law: "[t]he essence of the antitrust
laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market., 60 Inother
words, the consumer comes first.

58

John J. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic,

Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy Introduction, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
1182, 1186 n.9 (1977) (quoting Daniel Yankelovitch).
59 Compare Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717 (stating "although the empirical
evidence on the topic is limited .

. . .")

(Kennedy, J.) with id. at 2729 (asking

"[h]ow often, for example, will the benefits to which the Court points occur in

practice? I can find no economic consensus on this point.") (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979) (upholding right of

individual consumers to sue for treble damages for price fixing overcharges).

